EXPORT SUBSIDIES AND PROFIT-SHIFTING IN VERTICAL MARKETS by Sheldon, Ian M. et al.
Journal  ofAgricultural  and Resource Economics 26(1):125-141
Copyright 2001 Western Agricultural  Economics Association
Export Subsidies and
Profit-Shifting in Vertical Markets
Ian M. Sheldon,  Daniel H. Pick,
and Steve McCorriston
This study examines the interaction between export subsidies and profit-shifting in
a vertical production system consisting of agricultural  commodity production,  and
intermediate  and  final good  processing,  where  the latter  two  stages  may be
characterized by imperfect competition. Using a model with general functional forms
for demand,  comparative statics indicate that an export subsidy to an unprocessed
agricultural  commodity, under  certain circumstances,  can have greater profit-
shifting effects at the final processing stage compared to an export subsidy targeted
at the final processed good.
Key words: export subsidies, profit-shifting, vertical markets
Introduction
A key outcome of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) of GATT was
the imposition  of meaningful  restraints on the use  of agricultural  export subsidies.
Notwithstanding  this, very few countries either have actually changed their policies
substantially  in order to conform with the commitments they made on signing of the
URAA, or have made plans to reduce their export subsidy commitments in the future
[U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)]. Use of export subsidies worldwide averaged
$8.4 billion over 1995-96, with the European Union (EU) accounting for about 84%  of
the value of these subsidies. Even though U.S. expenditures on export subsidies through
the Export Enhancement Program (EEP), and other subsidy programs, are considerably
smaller than those incurred by the EU, expenditures rose to $121 million in 1996
(USDA).1
Since the inception of EEP and other export subsidy programs, several studies have
examined the impact of such subsidies, with most focusing on the domestic and inter-
national price effects of wheat export subsidies (e.g., Abbott, Paarlberg, and Sharples;
Bohman, Carter, and Dorfman; Anania, Bohman, and Carter). A characteristic of this
particular research has been the focus on a single market level, that of the unprocessed
agricultural commodity subject to the export subsidy. Very little research has focused
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on the interaction  between export subsidies  at different stages  of the food  system-
essentially ignoring the fact that while the U.S. has typically targeted most of its export
subsidies at unprocessed agricultural commodities (such as wheat and oilseeds), the EU
has targeted nearly 70% of its export subsidies to high-value products (including pro-
cessed food products such as vegetable oils and pasta) (Ackerman, Smith, and Suarez).
Such a gap in research is also surprising in light of the argument that targeting export
subsidies at high-value products will generate greater economic benefits  than export
subsidies to unprocessed  agricultural commodities  (Ackerman, Smith, and Suarez;
Paarlberg).
An exception to the above discussion is a study by Paarlberg, who examined the effects
of export subsidies in the case of an unprocessed agricultural commodity (wheat) which
can be processed into an intermediate good (wheat flour), where both goods are exported
and export subsidies can be targeted at either of the two levels of the production system.
Paarlberg, however, did not consider the possibility that part(s) of a multi-stage produc-
tion  system is (are)  imperfectly competitive.  In both the U.S.  and EU, intermediate
processing has quite concentrated market structures. For example, in oilseed crushing,
the four-firm concentration ratio is estimated to be 83% in the U.S. (Larson), and 85%
in the EU (Scoppola), while in flour milling, the four-firm concentration ratio is 70% in
the U.S. (Wilson), and ranges from an average of 30% in France and Germany (Sutton)
to 81%  in the United Kingdom  (Bodjduniak and Sturgess).  In the case of final good
processing, there is substantial empirical evidence to suggest it is concentrated in both
the U.S. and EU (Connor and Schiek; Strak and Morgan; Sutton), and that firms in this
sector may exercise oligopolistic power (Bhuyan and Lopez).
Given there is some potential for imperfectly competitive behavior, and hence monop-
oly profits in the intermediate and final good processing stages of the food system, the
general issue of interest in this analysis is the extent to which export subsidies can have
different profit-shifting effects depending on the point in the vertical system where the
export subsidy is used; i.e., does it matter whether an export subsidy is targeted at either
the unprocessed agricultural commodity, the intermediate good, or the final processed
good?
The use of trade policies in vertical markets has been broadly addressed in a series
of papers in the international economics literature by Spencer and Jones (1991, 1992),
and more recently by Ishikawa and Spencer.  In Spencer and Jones (1991), the market
structure is one where, in the home country, there is a vertically integrated firm control-
ling exports of both an intermediate and a final good. This firm then competes in a foreign
country  with a firm that produces  the final good,  and  also has the  option of either
importing the intermediate good or producing it at higher cost. In the absence of trade
in the intermediate  good,  and  assuming Cournot interaction between  the two firms
producing the final good, the optimal policy for the home country is one of subsidizing
exports of the final good, which is essentially the Brander and Spencer (1985) result. In
the case of trade in intermediate and final goods, if profit margins are higher for trade
in the former, the optimal policy is a tax on exports of the final  good in order to shift
toward trade in the intermediate  good.
In the case of the foreign country, if the home country supplier of the intermediate
good has the opportunity to engage in vertical foreclosure, and again assuming Cournot
competition in the final good market, Spencer and Jones (1992) show it is optimal for
the foreign government to tax imports of the final good. This strategy has the effect of
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reducing the profit margin on the final good for the home firm relative to the profits it
can earn from exporting the intermediate good, hence reducing its incentive to vertically
foreclose in the intermediate good. Consequently, by shifting market share to the foreign
competitor, the tariff on the home final good generates an increase in demand for the
imported intermediate good.
Ishikawa and Spencer use a similar type of structure, except foreign firms supply the
intermediate good. Based on their findings, the case for an export subsidy to the home
firm is somewhat weakened  as rents are shifted to the foreign intermediate  good
producers, assuming Cournot competition in both the intermediate and final good
markets. Conversely, given appropriate demand conditions, an export subsidy to the
home firm can have beneficial effects because it reduces the inefficiency due to double-
marginalization, generating a terms-of-trade gain on imports by the home country of the
intermediate good.
In this study we also examine the interaction between export subsidies and profit-
shifting in a vertical production system, where each stage of production downstream from
agriculture may be characterized by imperfect competition. While we adopt a market
structure very similar to the earlier research cited above, our focus is on comparing the
profit-shifting  effect for the case where an export subsidy can be targeted at either  a
final processed good or at an unprocessed agricultural commodity, where the latter enters
the production process for an intermediate good subsequently used in production of the
final processed good. Our analysis is designed to capture the earlier observation that
some countries (such as the U.S.) have typically targeted export subsidies at unprocessed
agricultural commodities, while others (such as the EU) have focused on processed food
products.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In the next section, a model of
a vertical production system is developed using a general functional form for demand.
Comparative statics of introducing different export subsidies are then explored, followed
by an examination  of the sensitivity of the results to model assumptions. In the final
section, we provide a summary of the analysis and draw some policy implications.
A Theoretical Model
As illustrated in figure 1, the vertical structure analyzed here consists of three stages:
an agricultural sector, an upstream intermediate processing sector, and a final processing
sector. Oligopoly in the downstream final processing sector is modeled as a Nash equi-
librium in outputs. A home and a foreign processing firm compete in the downstream
final goods market in a third-country import market. Both downstream firms process
an intermediate good supplied to them by a single upstream processing firm in their
respective countries. We assume there is no trade in the intermediate good, implying the
home and foreign intermediate processing firms only compete with each other indirectly
via derived demand effects. In turn, the upstream firms process an agricultural commod-
ity, where the foreign upstream firm can import the agricultural commodity from the
world market as well as utilize domestic sources. The technology of production is assumed
to be one of fixed proportions, whereby one unit of the intermediate  good is required to
produce one unit of  the final good. Arms-length pricing between the upstream and down-
stream stages is also assumed, so that downstream firms take upstream prices as given.
In addition, agricultural commodity prices are treated as exogenous.






Figure 1. Vertical market share
In terms of timing, it is assumed upstream firms make their decisions first, followed
by downstream firms. Given agricultural commodity prices, and derived demand for the
intermediate good, the upstream processing firms act as profit-maximizing monopolists.
The equilibrium prices of the intermediate  good are then taken as given by the down-
stream processing firms who set output to maximize profits, generating a Nash equilib-
rium in the final goods market. Further, if policy instruments such as export subsidies
are  used, government is assumed to set the policy prior to firms making their profit-
maximizing choices so that the overall equilibrium is sub-game perfect. This assumption
rules out noncredible behavior by firms;  i.e.,  a firm playing Nash at the downstream
stage is only able to increase output if its government has already pre-committed to an
export subsidy (see Brander and Spencer 1985).  To solve the model, equilibrium is
derived for the downstream market first, and then the upstream market.
While the market structures of the intermediate and final good processing sectors are
relatively simple, they do capture the stylized facts about market structure outlined in
the previous section; i.e., markets in the intermediate and final processing sectors are
concentrated, generating the possibility of imperfectly competitive behavior, and hence
monopoly profits. The upstream and downstream markets could be modeled more gener-
ally as n-firm oligopolies in a manner similar to Ishikawa and Spencer. This, however,
adds unnecessary mathematical complexity, and (as will be discussed later) affects only
the magnitude of the effects and not the direction.
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Equilibrium  in the Downstream Processing  Market
Letting h and f  be the quantities of the final good sold by the home and foreign down-
stream processing firms,  respectively,  the relevant  inverse demand  functions  in the
importing country can be written as follows:
(1)  Ph(h, f)
and
(2)  pf(h, f),
where Ph and pf are the respective prices of the home and foreign downstream process-
ing firms. These functions satisfy the following properties, with the second subscript
being the relevant first derivative: Phh < 0, p f  < 0 (downward-sloping demands);phf < 0,
Pf,h < 0 (substitute products);phf =Pfh (Slutsky symmetry); andPhhPff  - Ph,fPfh > O, with
equality if the final goods are perfect substitutes (see Dixit 1986). Given (1) and (2), the
relevant downstream profit functions are written as:
(3)  uh(h, f; Zh)  = Ph(h, f)h  - (ch  - Zh)h
and
(4)  7tf(h, f; Zf)  =  f(h, f)f  - (Cf  - Zf)f,
where Ch and Cf are the downstream firms' marginal costs in terms of the purchase of the
intermediate good,  and Zh and Zf can be interpreted as shocks to each firm's marginal
cost-for example, either a per unit export subsidy to the processed good paid by the
foreign government (zf > 0), a change in the price of the intermediate  good (e.g., Zh < 0,
Zf > 0), or a per unit tariff levied by the importing country (Zf  < 0).
The first-order conditions for profit maximization are denoted by:
(5)  hh  = Ph(h  f)  + h  Ph,h -Ch  +Zh  =
and
(6)  Tff  = pf(h, f)  + f-pff  - Cf  + Zf  = 0.
Expressions  (5) and (6) can be interpreted  as implicit reaction functions for the home
and foreign downstream processing firms, respectively, representing the optimal output
choice for each firm given the output choice of the other firm. Simultaneous solution of
the first-order conditions generates the Nash equilibrium in outputs for the downstream
market, derived by totally differentiating (5) and (6):
(7)  ch,hhdh  +  h,hfdf  + Th,hzdZh  =  0
and
(8)  Affhdh  +  ff  df  +  f,fdzf  = 0.
For ease of analysis,  (7) and (8) can be rearranged in matrix form:
(9)  [ nh,hh  ~h,hf  dh  -dzh
[f,fh  Tfff  df  -dzfj
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In what follows, the interest is in determining the comparative static effects of vary-
ing the downstream processing firms' costs of purchasing the intermediate good, and the
effects of varying the per unit subsidy/tariff, i.e., dzi, i = h, f }. Given (9), the solution to
the system is found by rearranging in terms of dh and df and inverting, where A is the
determinant of the nt  matrix in (9), containing the own- and cross-effects  of changes in
output on downstream firms' marginal profits:
~(10)  1~  dh  1  [  f,ff  -~h,hf  -dzh
(10)  I  I  I
df J  A L  f,fh  7h,hh  -dzf
For stability of the Nash equilibrium,  the diagonal of the 'n matrix must be negative,
where the second-order conditions  are  hhh< 0 and  TS y  < 0. Also, the determinant A
must be positive, i.e., A  - (h,  hhTf,  ff - h,hfe7f,fh)  > 0 (see Brander and Spencer 1984, 1985;
Dixit 1986).
The latter stipulation is implied by the following conditions:  rh,  hf < 0 and  Stffh  < 0,
and also | Thhh  >  7h,hf | and I  lf,ff  > I sffh l. The first condition states that the home (for-
eign) firm's marginal profit declines in the output of the foreign (home) firm. This is the
case of "normal" Nash-Cournot behavior, where firms' reaction functions are downward-
sloping, and (to use Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer's terminology) each firm regards
its good as a strategic  substitute for the other firm's good. From the second condition,
the own-effect  of output on a firm's marginal profits outweighs  cross-effects,  where
the condition is satisfied  as long as marginal  cost is nondecreasing (see Brander and
Spencer  1985).
Equilibrium  in the Upstream Processing  Market
Rearranging the first-order conditions (5) and (6) gives the inverse derived demand
functions facing the upstream processing firms, where the downstream firms' costs c,
{i = h, f  are equivalent to the upstream firms' pricesp  i = h, f,  and zi {i = h, f  are
the downstream policy instruments that shift the inverse derived demand curves facing
upstream  firms:
(11)  Ph(h, f)  +  Zh
and
(12)  P(h,f) +Zf
Firms' profits at the upstream stage can then be written as:
(13)  'ih(^h, f; zh,  Zh)  = P(h  f)h - (ch  - h  - zh)h
and
(14)  'c  (h, f;  Zf)  = p}(h, f)f  - (c)  -z  zf)f,
where c  U {  i = h, f  } are the costs to upstream processing firms of purchasing the agri-
cultural commodity,  and h(f) = hU(f  ) given the assumption of fixed proportions. The
notation z" {i = h, f  can be interpreted as shocks to upstream firms' marginal costs. For
example, an export subsidy targeted to the unprocessed agricultural commodity will
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affect these costs. Equilibrium for the upstream market is derived in a manner similar
to the downstream market, and can be represented by:
dh u Ttn  -7h
(15)  -(d  + d
df  - -fh  hhh  - (dz  +dzf)
Note, even though each upstream processing firm is assumed to be a monopoly supplier
to each downstream firm, changes in output by either upstream firm affect the marginal
profits of the other upstream firm through their derived demand curve, given changes
in output by the downstream processing firms. Hence, both own-effects and cross-effects
on firms' marginal  profits are  included in the upstream equilibrium matrix.  Similar
conditions to the case of the downstream equilibrium described in (10) are assumed for
the tu matrix in (15), containing the own- and cross-effects  of changes in downstream
and upstream output on upstream firms' marginal profits, i.e., Au  > O, Thf < 0,  <  Cfh < 0,
\  h,hh  > \  ,hf  ,  and  I uffl  >  1;fhl.
Comparative Statics
Policies Targeted at the Downstream Processing  Stage
The focus of this section is the effect on output, prices, and profits of a per unit export
subsidy targeted at the foreign firm at the downstream stage. This emphasis captures
the idea that some countries, such as those in the EU, typically target a large portion
of their export subsidies at final processed  goods. The analysis can easily be applied to
a per unit import tax imposed by the importing country, but throughout the remaining
discussion we focus only on export subsidies, as these are the primary consideration of
the study.
*  Output Effect. Using (10), and setting dzh = 0:
(16)  dh  =  h,hfdZf
and
(17)  df  =  h,hh  -dZf
A
Given  7hhh  < 0, Thhf < 0, and A > 0, home  downstream output will fall with a foreign
export subsidy (dhldzf < 0), and foreign downstream  output will increase (dfldzf > 0),
where, due to the condition  I  hhh I > I  nhhf i, then I df I > I  dh  i.
*  Price Effect. The inverse demand functions given in (1) and (2) can be totally differ-
entiated, where the changes in price, given a foreign export subsidy, are defined as
follows:
(18)  dph  =Ph,h dh +Phfjdf
and
(19)  dpf  = Pffdf + Pfhdh.
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From the conditions written on the inverse demand functions,  and the signs on dh and
df, if the goods are perfect substitutes (i.e., Phh = Phf and  Pff  =  Pf,h), then both dp^ldzf
and dpf/dzf < 0 for a foreign export subsidy. In general, these results will also hold for
the case of imperfect substitutes (i.e., Ph,h , Ph,  and Pff + Pfh).
*  Profit  Effect.  Totally differentiating the profit functions  (3)  and (4), the changes in
profits are given as:
(20)  d7:h  = h'Ph,hdf -h
and
(21)  d  f  = f.pff.dh  + f.
Given the conditions assumed on the inverse demand functions, and the signs of dh and
df, dlrh/dzf  < 0 and dtfldzf  > 0 for a foreign export subsidy.  Essentially, this is the
Brander and Spencer (1985) result: the foreign downstream export subsidy shifts profits
to the foreign processing firm away from the home processing firm.2
Upstream Effects of Downstream Policies
It  is important to note there will be feedback  effects of a foreign downstream  export
subsidy on intermediate processing output, prices, and profits.
*  Output Effect. Using (15), and setting dzh = 0:
(22)  dhu-  hhffdz
Au
and
(23)  df  =  h,hh  f
AU
Given  huhh < 0,  hf < 0,  and  Au > 0, home upstream output will fall with a foreign
export subsidy (dh/ldzf < 0), and foreign upstream output will increase (dfuldzf > 0),
where, due to the condition Ihh  I  | > I h,hf  , then I  df  l  > I  dh  1.
*  Price  Effect.  The inverse derived demand functions in (11) and (12) can be totally dif-
ferentiated, where the changes in upstream prices, given a downstream foreign export
subsidy, are defined as follows:
(24)  ~ ,u  u  . df" (24)  dph  = Ph,hdh  +  Phdf
and
(25)  dpu  = pf  .df  + pfhdhu + 1.
If th  ownre  own-price  effects p  i =  h,  f  are not significantly larger than the cross-price
effects pij {  i  +  j},  and given that [dfu  > Idh  l, then for a foreign  downstream  export
subsidy, dph/dzf < 0. In addition, as long as the absolute value of the slope of the foreign
2 In the case of pasta products, the Italian government has used export subsidies, negatively affecting the profits of U.S.
pasta manufacturers  (see U.S. International  Trade Commission).
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inverse derived demand function Ipf  | < 1, then dpu/ldzf > 0.3 Therefore, for a given equi-
librium level of output at the downstream stage, the home (foreign) intermediate good
price falls (rises) with an export subsidy to the foreign downstream firm.
*  Profit Effect. In the case of upstream firms' profits, totally differentiating the profit
functions  (13) and (14) gives:
(26)  diu  = hphdfu  - h
and
(27)  du = f  pf-ufdh  + f.
Given the signs of dhU and df , for an export subsidy to the final good, dI/dzf < 0 and
dlT/dz f > 0;  i.e., profits are shifted to the foreign intermediate processing firm with an
export subsidy to the foreign downstream processing firm. Essentially, an export subsidy
targeted at the foreign downstream firm harms the home downstream  and upstream
processing firms.4
Policies Targeted at the Unprocessed
Agricultural  Commodity
Instead of a per unit export subsidy being targeted at the foreign processing firm at the
downstream stage, suppose an equivalent export subsidy is targeted at the unprocessed
agricultural commodity in the home country which can be imported by firms producing
the intermediate good in the foreign country. This approach captures the notion that
countries  such as the United States have targeted most of their export  subsidies at
unprocessed agricultural commodities.  Following the existing literature on the effects
of commodity export subsidies in competitive markets, such a policy is expected to lower
the foreign upstream processing firm's costs  (dzfu ) by lowering the agricultural commod-
ity's world price and, depending  on the elasticity of supply, raise the home upstream
processing firm's costs  (dzKu)  (see, for example, Paarlberg,  p. 121). 5In turn, these cost
changes are transmitted to the foreign and home downstream processing  firms (dz,)
{i = h, f }, and consequently downstream firms' outputs, prices,  and profits. We focus
first on the upstream processing stage.
*  Output  Effect. Using expression (15), the effects on upstream output of an export sub-
sidy to the agricultural commodity by the home country are represented by:




* =  -ffhdZh  + 7hhh dz
AU
3 Following Ishikawa  and Spencer, the exact condition is that the elasticity of the  slope of the inverse derived  demand
function must be less than one.
4 There will also be feedback effects  from the intermediate  processing  sector  to the agricultural  sector, which  are not
modeled explicitly here.
5 We assume the change in the world price of the agricultural commodity is fully transmitted to the foreign upstream firm.
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where the asterisk on dhu* and df *  distinguishes the effects of an export subsidy to the
unprocessed agricultural commodity from those of a subsidy to the final processed good.
Given the conditions  assumed on the profit matrix Tu" in (15),  dhu*/(dz  + dz  ) < 0 and
df u/(dz  d  +  dz)  >0.
*  Price  Effect.  Totally differentiating the inverse derived demand functions  (11) and
(12), the upstream price changes are given as:
,  *  · U (30)  dph  = Ph,hdhu +phf'dfu
and
(31)  dpf  = pf  df  +  puh dhu.
If the own-price effects p.I  {i = h,f} are greater than the cross-price effects p u  {i = h,f },
then the increase (decrease) in agricultural commodity prices-which raises (lowers) the
home (foreign) upstream processing firm's marginal costs-outweighs the effects of the
inward (outward) shift in the derived demand curve due to cross-effects. Given the signs
on dhu* and dfu* from (28) and (29), and assuming symmetric  output effects  IdfU*l  =
IdhU*],  an export subsidy to the agricultural  commodity causes the home upstream
firm's price  to rise (dpI  /(dz h +  dz  ) > 0), and the foreign upstream firm's price to fall
(dpf (dz  dz  + dz  ) < 0).
It is also important at this point to say something about the incidence  or pass-through
of the marginal cost change by upstream processing firms, which affects intermediate
prices faced by downstream  processing  firms.  Given own-price  effects upstream  are
expected to dominate, it is well known from the public finance literature that the degree
of pass-through will be a function of the convexity (concavity) of the inverse derived
demand function (see Seade 1980,  1985; Myles). For example, if the inverse demand
function were linear, as the upstream monopolists face a marginal revenue curve that
slopes at twice the rate of the demand curve, they will undershift  changes in their mar-
ginal costs (dpi  /dz i < 1). In contrast, with sufficient convexity in the demand function,
the upstream firms will overshift changes in their marginal costs (dpl  /dz i > 1).6
*  Profit  Effect. Totally differentiating the profit functions (13) and (14), changes in up-
stream firms' profits are denoted by:
(32)  d*  = h 'phhdfu - h
and
(33)  d￿*  = f.pfuf.dhu  + f.
Given the signs of dhU and df , for an export subsidy to the agricultural  commodity,
df/(dz  +  dz  ) < 0 and df  */(dz h +  dz  ) > 0; i.e.,  profits are shifted to (away from) the
foreign (home) intermediate processing firm with an export subsidy to the unprocessed
agricultural  commodity.
Next, we turn to the downstream sector.
6 The precise conditions for the extent of under/overshifting  are given by the elasticity of the slope of the inverse derived
demand function, known as Seade's E. This is defined as E 
u =  i  (piuii/pii) {i 
u = h,f}, and represents upstream firm output.
If E  < 1, there is undershifting, and if E"  > 1, there is overshifting (Seade 1980,  1985).
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*  Output Effect.  Using (10), and remembering that changes in upstream firms' prices
(dpf*) affect downstream firms' marginal costs (dzi), changes in downstream output are
designated by:
(34)  dh* =  'ff'dZh  +
±h'hf  dzf
and
(35)  df*= - ffh'dZh  + Ch,hh'-dzf
Given the conditions written on It, then dh *(dz h +  dzf) < 0  and df *(dzh  +  dzf) > 0 for an
export subsidy to the agricultural commodity.  Hence, an export subsidy to the agricul-
tural commodity (such as under EEP) can allow a foreign downstream processing firm
to more effectively penetrate the importing country downstream market, and thereby
gain market share.
A comparison of (34) and (35) with (16) and (17) reveals the effect on downstream
output of an export subsidy to the unprocessed agricultural commodity relative to
an equivalent export subsidy to the downstream  good will depend on the degree of
pass-through by the upstream processing firms, and the extent to which the export
subsidy raises the home agricultural commodity price. Five possibilities can be con-
sidered:
1. Suppose there is complete pass-through upstream (dpu  dz'  = 1), and the export (dpi  /  dz i =  1  ), and the export
subsidy to the agricultural commodity has no impact on the home agricultural
commodity price (dzh  =  0),  i.e., home agricultural commodity supply is perfectly
elastic.  In this case, (34) and (35) collapse  to (16) and (17) (dh* = dh and df*=
df), i.e., the downstream output effects are the same. This case is equivalent to
what would occur under two quite different upstream processing market struc-
tures: (a) perfect competition upstream, where upstream firms fully pass through
the change in costs, and (b) vertical integration between the upstream and down-
stream processing firms, where the upstream monopoly markup is removed, and
the intermediate  good's transfer price is equal to marginal cost.
2.  Suppose there is complete pass-through upstream (dp  /dz  = 1), and the export
subsidy to the agricultural commodity does affect the home agricultural commod-
ity price (dzk  > 0), i.e., home agricultural commodity supply is less than perfectly
elastic.  In  this case,  the  output effects  are dh*> dh and df*> df, i.e.,  home
(foreign) downstream output falls (rises) more. Again, this result is equivalent
either to the case of perfect  competition upstream,  or vertical integration be-
tween the upstream and downstream processing firms.
3.  Suppose there is overshifting upstream (dp u  /dz  > 1 and  dzK > 0). The output
effects are then dh*> dh and df*> df, i.e.,  home (foreign) downstream  output
falls (rises) more.
4.  If there is undershifting upstream (dpi /dz i < 1 and  dzK  =  0), then the output
effects are dh*< dh and df*< df, i.e.,  home (foreign)  downstream output falls
(rises) less.
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5.  If there is undershifting upstream (dpi /dz  < 1  and dzK > 0), then the output
effects  dh* and df* may be smaller than dh and df, with the likelihood depend-
ing on the extent of undershifting.
*  Price  Effect. Totally differentiating the inverse demand functions (1) and (2), down-
stream price changes are calculated  as:
(36)  dPh =  h,hdh*+ ph,fdf*
and
(37)  dp; =pff  fdf*+Pf  h dh*
Given the signs on dh* and  df, with similar output effects (i.e., Idh* I  \  Idf* ), the price
effects are dph/(dzh +  dzf) > 0 and dph/(dzh +  dzf) < 0 for an export subsidy to the com-
modity  for  imperfect  substitutes,  holding  close  to equality  if the goods  are  perfect
substitutes. In addition, if the goods are perfect substitutes, and I  dh  *  [  I  df*  I  , the direc-
tion of the price change depends on which is the larger of the output effects.
*  Profit Effect.  Totally differentiating the profit functions  (3)  and (4), the changes  in
downstream profits are represented  by:
(38)  dT  h = h.ph,hdf-  h
and
(39)  d  f  =f.pff.dh* +f.
Given the conditions assumed on the inverse demand functions, and the signs on
dh* and df*, then dxh/(dzh +  dzf) < 0 and dT/(dzh +  dzf) > 0 for an export subsidy to the
agricultural  commodity.
Comparing (38) and (39) with (20) and (21), the difference in profit effects depends
on the difference between Idf* I and Idf , and between  Idh*  and \dh i.  For example, if
possibility 2 holds, the downstream profit-shifting effects may be greater for an export
subsidy to the unprocessed agricultural commodity compared to an equivalent export
subsidy to the final processed good. Profit-shifting is greater because an export subsidy
to the agricultural  commodity is assumed to increase the price of the agricultural
commodity for the home upstream firm, which in turn increases the price of the home
intermediate good. This outcome is illustrated in figure 2, where the foreign downstream
firm's reaction function is shifted outward to Rf, while the home downstream firm's reac-
tion function is shifted inward to R', the new Nash equilibrium occurs at N', the foreign
firm's output expands to f', and the home firm's output falls to h'.
The extent to which the profit-shifting effects are greater,  however, will depend on
the cross-effects, and the degree to which the upstream processing sector passes through
the change in agricultural commodity prices. As discussed above, cross-effects and pass-
through will be reflected in the values of dh* and df*from (34) and (35), and the five
cases outlined will translate into different effects on downstream profits. These results
suggest that export subsidies targeted at an unprocessed agricultural commodity, which
can then be utilized by foreign processing firms, under certain circumstances may have
a greater negative effect on domestic processing firms' profits than export subsidies
targeted at foreign processors by their respective  governments.





h'  Rh  h  Rh  h
Figure 2.  Profit-shifting and export subsidies
Sensitivity of Results to Assumptions
In order to evaluate how general the results are, it is useful to consider the sensitivity
of the  results  to some of the underlying  assumptions  of the model. With respect  to
market structure, the upstream and downstream markets could be modeled as n-firm
oligopolies in a manner similar to Ishikawa and Spencer.  As noted earlier, this adds
unnecessary complexity, but the direction of the effects will be the same as the structure
outlined here. In the limit, however, as the numbers of firms in the upstream and down-
stream markets are increased,  the Nash equilibrium converges  asymptotically to the
competitive  outcome (Friedman). Consequently,  upstream and downstream oligopoly
profits disappear, and there will be no profit-shifting effects due to export subsidies.7
In addition, the key results concerning pass-through by upstream processing firms
are preserved if that sector is treated as an oligopoly as opposed to a monopoly.  Seade
(1980,  1985) has shown that convexity (concavity) of the demand curve in an oligopoly
affects the extent of pass-through  of cost changes. This result is also dependent on the
7 Based on results reported by Dixit (1984), if the number of firms increases in a Nash-Cournot game, eventually it is opti-
mal to promote tacit collusion with an export tax.
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presence of imperfect competition.  For example,  if the upstream processing sector in
each country is treated as an oligopoly, the marginal revenue curve will rotate toward
the derived demand curve (Hay and Morris).  Assuming convexity of the demand curve
is such that there is undershifting of changes in marginal costs, the shift from monopoly
to oligopoly upstream simply increases the extent of pass-through of cost changes. Full
pass-through will occur only if the intermediate processing sector is perfectly competi-
tive, irrespective of the convexity (concavity) of the demand function (see Myles). This
would also be the case if there were vertical integration between the downstream and
upstream firms, where the intermediate good is priced at marginal cost and changes in
marginal  cost are fully passed through within the integrated firm. These  market
structures were captured in possibilities  1 and 2 outlined in the previous section.
A game-theoretic criticism of the type of vertical  market structure  used in this analy-
sis has been raised by Ishikawa and Spencer. Essentially, it is assumed the downstream
processing firms act strategically in the final good market, but act as price takers in the
intermediate good market. Although this assumption is common in vertical market
models,  it does ignore the possibility either that downstream firms can exert some
monopsony power or that there is bilateral monopoly (see, for example,  Salinger). It  is
not exactly clear how either of these market structures would be incorporated  into a
model where the upstream processing firms move first to produce the intermediate good.
One possibility, as noted by Ishikawa and Spencer, is to allow several firms to compete
at the final stage, thus reducing the potential for monopsony power. Alternatively, it can
be assumed the upstream intermediate firms sell to a large number of different down-
stream sectors, reducing any monopsony power one individual downstream sector may
have.8 This seems a plausible assumption for the food system where intermediate inputs,
such as flour or semi-processed vegetable oils, may be inputs into a variety of downstream
processed food products.
In terms of the technology, the assumption of fixed proportions has been commonly
posited in both the trade and industrial organization literatures [see, e.g., Salinger's
analysis of  vertical markets and market foreclosure, and the works of Spencer and Jones
(1991,  1992), and Ishikawa and Spencer on imperfect competition  and trade in inter-
mediate and final goods].  If, however,  a variable proportions technology  is allowed  for
downstream, some of the effects of the increase in home intermediate input prices will
be mitigated, because home downstream intermediate firms substitute toward a lower
cost input. Nevertheless,  the downstream profit-shifting  effects will still remain,
because the foreign downstream processing firms increase their output at the expense
of the home firms due to lower intermediate input prices. In reference to figure 2, the
foreign firm's reaction function still shifts out, but the inward shift of the home firm's
reaction function will be less, depending on the home firm's ability to substitute away
from the higher cost intermediate  good.
Finally, we address the slope of the reaction  functions. It was assumed the home
(foreign) processing firm's marginal profit declines in the output of the foreign (home)
processing firm. It is possible, given sufficient convexity of the demand function, for this
condition to be reversed, such that reaction functions are upward-sloping in output
space and products  are regarded as strategic  complements (Bulow, Goanakoplos, and
8An alternative suggested by Ishikawa and Spencer is to assume the downstream firms play a Kreps and Scheinkman type
game where capacity constraints ensure Cournot outcomes with price-taking behavior.
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Klemperer).  Necessarily,  this will  affect the comparative  static results obtained.  For
example, an export subsidy to the foreign downstream processing firm will increase the
outputs of both downstream firms, lowering prices and profits of both firms. However,
following Brander and Spencer (1985), we consider this case "perverse," and therefore
ignore it.9
Summary and Conclusions
Using a model designed to allow for imperfectly competitive behavior, we have examined
the profit-shifting effects of a foreign export subsidy targeted to a final processed good
in a vertical market system. These profit-shifting effects were compared to those of a
home export subsidy targeted to exports of an agricultural commodity subsequently used
in production of a foreign intermediate good, which is then used in a foreign exported
final good. Based on our results,  an export subsidy to the unprocessed  agricultural
commodity may have greater profit-shifting effects in the final goods market than a
downstream foreign export subsidy. In addition, both types of subsidy will result in
profits being shifted from the home to the foreign upstream processing firm.
While specific assumptions were made in deriving our findings, relaxing key assump-
tions relating to market structure and technology does not undermine the basic direction
of the results. However, the magnitude of profit-shifting does depend critically on two
factors: the extent to which a home export subsidy to an unprocessed agricultural com-
modity raises its home price, and the degree of pass-through  of these price changes by
upstream processing firms.
Following the previous literature on commodity export subsidies in competitive
markets, the benchmark is characterized as the case where the export subsidy raises the
home agricultural commodity price, lowers the agricultural commodity's world price, and
where there is also complete pass-through of such price changes by upstream processing
firms to downstream processors. This scenario leads to greater downstream profit-
shifting effects as compared to a downstream foreign export subsidy. Therefore, if there
is either over- or undershifting of changes in the price of the agricultural commodity by
the upstream firms, the downstream profit-shifting effects will be either exacerbated or
diluted. The actual magnitude of over- or under-shifting of agricultural commodity
prices in the U.S. and European upstream processing sectors, however, is ultimately an
empirical issue.
In conclusion, while the broader distributional effects of these policies have not been
considered explicitly in the analysis, our results suggest that policy makers may need
to pay careful attention to the upstream and downstream profit-shifting effects which
can occur when export subsidies (such as EEP) are applied to unprocessed agricultural
commodities,  and when other countries (such  as those in the EU) target a larger
proportion of their export subsidy budget to processed food products. Specifically,  the
implications for policy depend on whether or not countries make good on their commit-
ments in the URAA to reduce export subsidies.
9Nevertheless, it should be noted that if the model were set up in action space rather than output space, where actions
can be either output or prices, "normal" Bertrand behavior with upward-sloping reaction functions in price space is implied
by Th,hf > O and 
7
ffh > 0 (see Bulow,  Geanakoplos,  and Klemperer;  Leahy and Neary).
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If the EU and the U.S. do not reduce their use of export subsidies, then it is clear from
our analysis the U.S.  would be better off targeting such subsidies  at the processing
sector, although not for the reasons commonly asserted. The conventional argument for
targeting export subsidies at high-value products rests largely on potential multiplier
effects such as increased employment.  In this study, the argument for targeting such
subsidies at downstream stages rests on the fact that export subsidies on bulk products
may proffer a terms-of-trade advantage  to foreign exporters of processed  goods and/or
tax domestic downstream industries by raising the costs of intermediate goods. It should
be noted, however, this is a second-best policy for the U.S. If the U.S. and EU simultan-
eously target export subsidies at their respective processing sectors, the net effect is to
increase output on the world market, drive down the prices of final processed goods, and
lower the profits of U.S. and EU processors.
Alternatively, if the URAA agreement on reduction of export subsidies were binding,
the analysis presented here shows U.S. processing firms would actually benefit from two
effects. First, if the EU were to reduce export subsidies targeted at final processed goods,
U.S. processing firms would increase their market share and profits at the expense of EU
processing firms. In addition, this action would increase derived demand for the inter-
mediate good from U.S. upstream processing firms.  Second, if the U.S. were to reduce
export subsidies targeted at unprocessed agricultural commodities, upstream processing
costs would decline in the U.S., while they would rise in the EU. Likewise,  depending
on the degree of pass-through,  downstream processing  costs would be lowered in the
U.S., and raised in the EU. In turn, reducing export subsidies would increase the market
share and profits of U.S. final processing firms at the expense  of EU final processing
firms.
More broadly,  for policy makers and researchers  involved with the export subsidy
issue in the World Trade Organization, closer attention should be paid to the stage at
which  subsidies are  targeted because  subsidies  have potential  impacts on trade and
welfare that are not necessarily apparent in standard, perfectly competitive single-stage
models.
[Received July 1999; final revision received February  2001.]
References
Abbott, P. C., P. L. Paarlberg, and J. A. Sharples. "Targeted Agricultural Export Subsidies and Social
Welfare." Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 69,4(1987):723-32.
Ackerman,  K.  Z., M.  E.  Smith, and N.  R.  Suarez. "Agricultural Export Programs." USDA/Economic
Research Service, Washington DC, 1995.
Anania, G., M. Bohman, and C. A. Carter. "United States Export Subsidies in Wheat: Strategic Trade
Policy or Expensive Beggar-Thy-Neighbor Tactic?" Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 74,3(1992):534-45.
Bhuyan, S., and R. Lopez.  "Oligopoly Power in the Food and Tobacco Industries." Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
79,3(1997):1035-43.
Bodjduniak, R., and I. Sturgess. "Cereals and Oilseeds Products." In The UKFood and  Drink Industry,
eds., J. Strak and W.  Morgan, pp.  77-116. Cambridge,  England: Euro PA and Associates, 1995.
Bohman, M., C.  A.  Carter, and J.  H. Dorfman.  "The Welfare  Effects of Targeted Export Subsidies: A
General Equilibrium Approach." Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 74,3(1991):693-702.
Brander, J. A.,  and B. J.  Spencer. "Tariff Protection and Imperfect Competition." In Monopolistic Com-
petition and International  Trade, ed.,  H. Kierzkowski,  pp.  194-206.  Oxford, England:  Clarendon
Press, 1984.
140  July 2001Export Subsidies and  Profit-Shifting in Vertical Markets  141
."Export Subsidies and International Market Rivalry." J. Internat. Econ. 18,1(1985):83-100.
Bulow, J. I., J. D. Geanakoplos, and P. D. Klemperer. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and
Complements." J. Polit. Econ. 93,3(1985):488-511.
Connor, J. M., and W. A. Schiek. Food  Processing:  An Industrial  Powerhouse in Transition. New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1997.
Dixit, A. K. "International Trade Policy for Oligopolistic Industries." Econ. J.  94, Supplement (1984):
1-16.
."Comparative Statics for Oligopoly." Internat. Econ. Rev.  27,1(1986):107-22.
Friedman, J.  W. Oligopoly Theory. London: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
Hay, D. A., and D. J. Morris. Industrial  Economics and Organization. London: Oxford University Press,
1991.
Ishikawa, J., and B. J.  Spencer. "Rent-Shifting Export Subsidies with an Imported Intermediate Pro-
duct." J. Internat. Econ. 48,2(1999):199-232.
Kreps,  D.  M.,  and J.  A.  Scheinkman.  "Quantity Precommitment  and Bertrand  Competition  Yield
Cournot Outcomes." Bell J. Econ. 14,2(1983):326-37.
Larson, D. W. "U.S. Soybean Processing: Structure and Ownership Changes." In Structural  Change  and
Performance  of the U.S.  Grain  Marketing System,  eds., D. W. Larson,  P. W.  Gallagher,  and R.  P.
Dahl, pp. 201-16. Urbana IL: Scherer Communications,  1998.
Leahy, D., and J. P. Neary. "Public Policy Towards R&D in Oligopolistic Industries."Amer. Econ. Rev.
87,4(1997):642-62.
Myles,  G. D. Public  Economics. London:  Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Paarlberg,  P. L. "Agricultural Export Subsidies and Intermediate Goods Trade." Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
77,1(1995):119-28.
Salinger, M. A. "Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure." Quart. J. Econ. 103,2(1988):345-56.
Scoppola,  M. "Multinationals  and Agricultural  Policy in the EC  and USA." Food Policy 20,1(1995):
11-25.
Seade, J.  "The Stability of Cournot Revisited." J. Econ. Theory 23,1(1980):15-27.
."Profitable Cost Increases and the Shifting of Taxation: Equilibrium Responses  of Markets in
Oligopoly."  Econ. Res. Pap. No. 260, University of Warwick,  1985.
Spencer, B. J., and R. W. Jones. "Vertical Foreclosure and International Trade Policy." Rev. Econ. Stud.
58,1(1991):153-70.
."Trade and Protection in Vertically Related Markets." J. Internat. Econ. 32,1(1992):31-55.
Strak, J., and W. Morgan, eds. The UK Food and Drink Industry. Cambridge, England: Euro PA and
Associates,  1995.
Sutton, J. Sunk Costs and Market Structure. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 1991.
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Agriculture in the WTO. Internat. Agr. and Trade Rep. No. WRS-98-4,
USDA/Economic Research Service, Washington DC, 1998.
U.S. International Trade Commission. "Certain Pasta from Italy and Turkey." Unnum. pub., USITC,
Washington DC, 1996.
Wilson,  W.  W.  "Structural  Changes in the North  American Flour Milling Industry."  In Structural
Change and Performance  of the U.S. Grain  Marketing System, eds., D. W. Larson, P. W. Gallagher,
and R. P. Dahl, pp.  165-80. Urbana IL: Scherer Communications,  1998.
Sheldon, Pick, and McCorriston